Sadistic Hedgehogs and Philosophical Harbor: I. Berlin and G. Deleuze on Two Modes of Thinking

The research aims to distinguish two types of philosophizing or philosophical attitudes based on Isaiah Berlin’s distinction between foxes and hedgehogs. We argue that the schematic division of philosophers into “those who contemplate the one” and “those who contemplate the many” lacks specificity. Moreover, seekers of uniformity and seekers of diversity often merge, making them difficult to differentiate. To address this issue, we explore a more nuanced implementation of this distinction by examining Berlin's attempts to connect types of philosophizing with concepts of wisdom and a sense of reality. We analyzed how wisdom, or the ultimate goal of philosophizing, relates to narratives in philosophical thought and the corresponding goals attributed to these narratives. By reformulating this distinction, we outline its structural similarities with Gilles Deleuze's analysis of enjoyment and self-affirmation in his text The Performance of Sacher-Masoch (Coldness and Cruelty). Deleuze's depictions of the sadist and masochist provide a fresh perspective on the long-standing debate regarding research strategies in philosophy. We suggest that opposing types of self-affirmation are linked to differing inclinations in relation to the ultimate goal of philosophical inquiry. In conclusion, we propose how evaluating the awareness of the connection between modes of self-affirmation and modes of thinking can help both hedgehogs and foxes liberate themselves from cognitive illusions that may be inherent in their respective approaches.

Keywords: hedgehogs and foxes; Coldness and Cruelty; multitude; limits of narrative; aims of philosophy