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catalogue – 43669
Until 01.01.2019 - Scientific Yearbook of the Institute of Philosophy and Law of the Ural Branch of the Russian Academy of Sciences

ISSN 2686-7206 (Print)

ISSN 2686-925X (Оnlinе)

Ryabushkina Tatyana
 The article is a transcendental phenomenological research for the phenomenon of life that shows how from the point of view of theory of knowledge it is possible to explain the consciousness of the difference between animate and inanimate objects, as well as changes in the understanding of this difference in the development of West European thought. The analysis of Kant's conception of a “natural purpose” and Husserl's conception of the “lived body” shows that the living being differs from the inanimate object by the special character of causality. However, Kant's apriorism can’t explain the existence of various types of objects, such as the animate and the inanimate, in conscious experience that subjects to general a priory forms. Kant is forced to admit that it is impossible to cognize a priori the special causality of the living beings – causality, which is not reduced to the “efficient cause” that determines the objective order of phenomena. Husserl fails to show that the phenomenon of life is rooted in subjectivity, i.e. he fails to understand the phenomenon within the framework of the phenomenological project of understanding consciousness as the single field of sense-giving. Moreover, the late reflections of the philosopher demonstrate the impossibility of constituting the animate object within passivity – the deepest layer of sense accomplishments that precedes ego’s synthetic activity. S. L. Frank’s studies show that the basis of the spiritual unity is the unity that goes beyond the sphere of consciousness. It allows Frank to prove that there is an inseparable connection between life and knowledge, but his understanding of life as absolute being cannot be considered as proved. Clarifying the relationship between the concepts of “life” and “knowledge”, the author shows how the change of cognitive attitudes brings a new understanding of the place and role of life in the human-conscious world. First, there is a change from the identification of truth and life, from the recognition of the world as an alive world to the assertion of the existence of not only animate but also inanimate things, then, there is a reduction of life to the organism – the subject of biology, and finally – the gradual disappearance of life from consciousness, erasing the semantic boundary between a living being and a machine. 
Keywords: transcendental philosophy; phenomenology; subjectivity; constitution; transcendence; lifeworld; lived body; passive synthesis; all-unity; alive knowledge; living being; inanimate object; the conscious; the before-conscious.
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