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catalogue – 43669
Until 01.01.2019 - Scientific Yearbook of the Institute of Philosophy and Law of the Ural Branch of the Russian Academy of Sciences

ISSN 2686-7206 (Print)

ISSN 2686-925X (Оnlinе)

Yarkeev Aleksey

Abstract: The article considers Kant’s conception of radical evil in the aspect of extracting implications concerning contemporary ethical and political meditations. It reveals such a perspective of Kant’s moral philosophy, according to which the moral law presents itself as the entity where true moral position and evil are fully identical. Kant eliminated such a view on the moral law as impossible “diabolical evil”. This kind of evil is not driven by pathological motivation; that is why it fully corresponds to the criterion of a moral deed. This innate problem of Kant’s moral philosophy may be solved by means of subjectivizing the moral law when moral subject assumes full responsibility for the translation of the categorical imperative into a concrete moral obligation, which has the structure of Kant’s aesthetic judgment. Kantian reflective judgment opens a space of subjected political being.
Keywords: radical evil, diabolical evil, moral law, categorical imperative, ideology, subject, aesthetic judgment.

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