Yarkeev Aleksey
Abstract: The article considers the problem of adequate conceptual representation of social evil. Traditionally, social evil is theoretically represented by categories of objectivity and subjectivity. But, the results of both total objection and total subjection are the same because they make the causes of social evil transcendental, which means getting out of thinking subject. From the author’s point of view, such representation is a myth that could assent and legitimate a system of actions leading to multiplying the social evil. An adequate solution of this problem could be found with the help of Schelling’s method of subject-object identity added by Heidegger’s hermeneutical ontology. It allows representing social evil in structures of objectivity and subjectivity, at the same time avoiding its naturalization and mythologization.
Keywords: social evil, myth, subjectivity, objectivity, action, thinking, subject-object identity.