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2020
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catalogue – 43669
ANTINOMIES
Until 01.01.2019 - Scientific Yearbook of the Institute of Philosophy and Law of the Ural Branch of the Russian Academy of Sciences

ISSN 2686-7206 (Print)

ISSN 2686-925X (Оnlinе)

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Philosophy

Knowledge Logic and Algebra of Formal Axiology: a Formal Axiomatic Epistemology Theory Sigma Used for Precise Defining the Exotic Condition Under Which Hume-and-Moore Doctrine of Logically Unbridgeable Gap Between Statements of Being and Statements o

Lobovikov, Vladimir

Abstract. For the first time, in the formal axiomatic epistemology theory Sigma such a theorem is formally proved which means (in the precisely defined interpretation) that under the condition of knowledge a-priori-ness, a statement of formal-axiological equivalence of moral-evaluation-functions is logically equivalent to logic equivalence of corresponding statements of being. For the first time it is shown that this theorem undermines universality of the conception of Hume and Moore. A precise definition is given for the formal axiomatic theory Sigma, which is a result of logical formalization of the universal philosophical epistemology; and a relevant interpretation of this formal theory is submitted. The formal proof of the theorem can be examined by readers step by step as it is accomplished in accordance with the formalism standards.

Keywords: formal-axiomatic-epistemology-theory; a-priori-knowledge; two-valuedalgebra-of-formal-axiology; formal-axiological-equivalence; moral-evaluation-function; Hume-guillotine; naturalistic-fallacies-in-ethics; fact-value-dualism.

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The Problem of Other Minds: “Threat of Skepticism” and Possible Ways to Overcome it (on the Example of Simon Glendinning and Frederic Olafson’s Concepts)

Murtazin Salawat

Abstract. This article is dedicated to one of current problems in modern philosophy: the problem of other minds. It turns out to be characteristic of the “analytical” and “continental” traditions in philosophy. We believe that this problem has not only an epistemological or ontological aspect, but also an ethical one, and the results of its development should not be ignored when solving the problem of searching for ethical foundations. To confirm this assumption, we have done the following: First, we consider the very essence of the problem of other minds in Alec Hyslop and Simon Glendinning's approaches to its formulation. This problem is based on the asymmetry between the perception of our mental states and the perception of the mental states of others. Second, we have briefly discussed one of the best-known approaches in solving this problem, namely, argument by analogy. According to this theory, we base our judgments on the feelings and experiences of others on the analogy with our own feelings and experiences, and their manifestation in our behavior. We also consider possible critical approaches of this theory. Third, we run into extremely serious difficulty in solving the problem of other minds, namely the “threat of skepticism”. We encounter an extremely serious difficulty in solving the problem of another consciousness, namely, the “threat of skepticism”. It consists in the fact that we do not have a reliable means to justify satisfactorily the existence of something that supports the “external” acts of human behavior, such as feelings of pain. We have considered two approaches that, in fact, do not refute the skepticism arguments, but avoid the very appearance of their threat. These are Simon Glendinning’s concepts of “reframing of skepticism” and “reading-response”, as well as the idea of the need to recognize the reality of the other by the possibility of knowing the reality that surrounds us, presented by Frederick Olafson. These approaches in order to overcome the “threat of skepticism”, suggest a rejection of the traditional purely epistemological approach to solve the problem of other minds, which was characterized by an emphasis on the problematic relationship between our knowledge of the other's mental states and reality of its existence. The fight against the “threat of skepticism”, as well as the contradictions that such skepticism generates, in fact, lead us to the need to study the ethical aspect of being with others, which cannot be considered without epistemological and ontological aspects.

Keywords: other; consciousness; being with others; skepticism; epistemology; analogy; reframing of skepticism; criteria; deconstruction; ethics.

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Moral Universality in the Ethics of Classical Utilitarianism (Jeremy Bentham, John Stuard Mill)

Platonov Roman

Abstract. The article sets a goal to define the meanings of moral universality in the ethics of classical utilitarianism, to establish their differences and connections, to show the significance of universality in the utilitarian method of moral calculation. Since the problem of moral universality was not set as part of utilitarianism, i.e. it is not shown in any theoretical provisions, we use the contextual analysis method of the use of words “universal”, “general”, “absolute”, “common” and so on when moral values and rules are describing in the key works of J. Bentham and J.S. Mill (“An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation”, “Utilitarianism”, “On Liberty”). As a starting point of the research, we take the classification of meaning differences of moral universality (it was done by R.G. Apresyan): universality as absoluteness, as ubiquity, and as generalization of moral values and rules. We show that both philosophers, in one way or another, used all three meanings in their arguments, but all three are conceptually significant only in J.S. Mill’s ethics. Absoluteness characterizes the primary principle (the principle of utility) and defines ethics as knowledge aimed at the search for moral truth. Ubiquity reflects the variability of moral values and rules and the fact that local cultural experience limits them. Generalization is a method of moral calculation whereby every action must be correlated with the principle of utility. At the same time, J.S. Mill, in contrast to J. Bentham, does not deny the importance of generality and complements it with “universal experience”, i.e. the experience of humanity as a species. Thus, he reveals moral values and rules not only in the aspect of locality and variability, but also in the aspect of fundamental skills of interaction of people with each other, skills of building any community. It also allowshim to supplement the method of moral calculation with generalizing concrete rules without giving them the status of absoluteness, he accepts them as an important heuristic component of moral development. The connection of the three meanings of universality is found in the expression of dominance: absoluteness as moral truth, ubiquity as recognition, generalization as inclusion of the particular in the general, all of it express the claims of moral evaluation to priority over any other types of evaluations and rules. It is concluded that the problem of universality is fundamental for the development of the method of moral calculation, and that it is revealed as fully as possible in the ethics of classical utilitarianism.

Keywords: ethics; morality; utilitarianism; universality; absoluteness; ubiquity; universalizability; generalization; J. Bentham; J.S. Mill.

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