Anisin Andrey
This article examines the ontological and methodological foundations of jurisprudence, critically assessing its unique position within the system of sciences. The study’s relevance stems from persistent unresolved problems in legal philosophy and the consequent fragility of legal science’s methodological underpinnings. Its central aim is to advance a conceptual framework for the philosophical understanding of jurisprudence. The analysis demonstrates that law cannot be reduced either to arbitrary expressions of human will (individual or collective) or to mere reflections of objective natural laws. While the notion of natural law offers profound insights into law’s essence, the article argues for a crucial distinction: what is termed “natural law” is neither strictly natural nor strictly law in the conventional sense. Methodologically, the study draws on Immanuel Kant’s philosophical system and the legal-philosophical works of Sergey S. Alekseev, positing that natural law constitutes postulates of legal reason – those are priori conditions that enable any coherent normative legal judgments. At the foundation of natural law lies the concept of justice, understood as a proportional correspondence between merit and retribution (in both positive and negative dimensions). The article further develops the notion of a priori forms of legal sensibility, comprising 1) the recognition of individuals as moral agents whose actions are evaluable against universal justice; 2) the mandated societal response by authorized institutions upholding this universal standard. Consequently, jurisprudence – along with ethics – is shown to be fundamentally philosophical rather than scientific in its nature; it represents an applied branch of legal philosophy. The study concludes that the historical lack of legal philosophy within Russia’s 20th century intellectual tradition has contributed significantly to contemporary jurisprudence’s methodological deficiencies.
Keywords: philosophy of law; legal positivism; natural law; postulates of legal reason; legal equality; legal justice; universality of law; transcendentalism of law
Nersesyants Anna
This article examines the ancient Greek conceptual triad – isonomia, isegoria, and isocratia (equality before the law, equality of speech, and equality of power) – as an articulation of the principle of legal equality in social relations. The author conducts a jurisprudential analysis of these fundamental concepts tracing their origins to the philosophical inquiry into equality in early Greek thought. Central to this framework is the concept of isonomia (legal equality), which forms the triad’s basis, while isegoria and isocratia function as its elaborations. A key focus is the evolution of isonomia from the earlier concept of isomoiria, a fusion of isos (equal) and moira (portion, lot). In archaic Greece, moira denoted a person’s destiny, reflected in distributed shares (e.g. a sacrificial animal’s portion). With the rationalization of the mythological worldview, isomoiria transitioned into isonomia as a normative legal principle, later complemented by isegoria and isocratia. The analysis highlights isonomia’s role as a safeguard against hybris – an ethico-legal category specific to Ancient Greece, signifying the transgression of divinely or socially ordained boundaries. The study employs libertarian-juridical theory of law as its theoretical framework, positing that interpersonal equality in social relations is inherently legal in nature, with its substance shaped by the historical and juridical context of a given society. By situating the Greek triad within its intellectual and historical milieu, the author demonstrates how studying the philosophical origins of equality deepens our understanding of law’s essence: the imposition of a universal and equal measure on human freedom to ensure justice in social interactions.
Keywords: legal equality; freedom; democracy; Ancient Greece; philosophy of law; isonomia; isegoria; isocratia; hybris; slavery
Kasatkin Sergey
The article present a distinctive analytical perspective on the doctrine of legal indeterminacy and judicial discretion as formulated by the eminent British legal philosopher Herbert Hart. Its primary objective is to examine how the constitutive elements of this doctrine – notable for its linguistic specifics and interpretive controversies – intersect with the traditional jurisprudential concepts of legal gap and legal conflict, along with the systematic mechanisms for addressing them. By doing so, the study aims to facilitate a more nuanced application of Hart’s theoretical ideas, while fostering greater coherence in legal scholarship. The article captures the peculiarities of Hart’s methodology, particularly his conception of analytical jurisprudence as a philosophical discipline that is secondary and “detached” from the perspective of legal participants and is opposed to normative jurisprudence and classical legal doctrine. Special emphasis is placed on Hart’s preoccupation with explaining the normativity of law, an orientation that determines his abstract and peripheral treatment of legal reasoning. Proceeding from this interpretive framework, the article elucidates Hart’s concept of law’s open texture – understood as the inherent vagueness in applying legal rules to unforeseen or atypical circumstances. This concept serves as an “umbrella term” which encompasses various types of legal indeterminacy; however, the conflation of the latter with legal incompleteness introduces tensions with Hart’s original agenda and methodology of its discussion. This article further reconstructs Hart’s underdeveloped doctrine of norm-conflicts, a theme largely absent in both his own writings and secondary academic literature, highlighting both its parallels with traditional theories of legal collisions and its theoretical grounding in the broader concept of open texture. Finally, the article examines Hart’s account of judicial discretion as the reasoned selection of a legal outcome that is not pre-determined by existing rules. Contrary to literal readings, judicial discretion in this context avoids negating with conventional methods for overcoming legal indeterminacy, but rather operates as an ultimate supplementary mechanism, enabling rule-following in atipical, unforeseen cases, where normative regulation is insufficient.
Keywords: Herbert Hart; open texture of law; legal indeterminacy; legal gap; legal conflict; legal collision; judicial discretion; legal reasoning; analytical jurisprudence
Vasechko Vyacheslav
The article examines the intellectual legacy and contributions of Praskovya Nikolaevna Tarnovskaya (1848–1910) – a leading figure in the Russian school of criminal anthropology during the late 19th and early 20th centuries. While historiographical interest in Russian criminological thought has grown, and numerous works have highlighted Tarnovskaya’s pioneering role in the study of female criminality, key aspects of her theoretical framework remain underexplored. The analysis focuses on Tarnovskaya’s methodological approach, emphasizing that the she never absolutized anthropometric methods in the study of deviant individuals. Instead she emphasized importance of understanding the offender’s personality, particularly the psychological distortions underlying criminal behavior. In developing her typology of female criminals – categorizing them as prostitutes, thieves and murderers – Tarnovskaya acknowledged its provisional nature, recognizing the need for refinement as empirical data expanded and theoretical models evolved. For Tarnovskaya, the central objective of criminal anthropology was to reveal the hereditary determinants of crime. She argued that a society equipped with precise scientific knowledge of the root causes of criminal thought and behavior would be better positioned to implement effective preventive measures and optimize rehabilitation strategies for offenders. The contemporary relevance of studying Praskovya Tarnovskaya’s work lies in its potential to inform critical assessments of modern criminal justice and penitentiary systems. By identifying systemic shortcomings and advancing evidence-based reforms, her insights may contribute to the development of more rational and effective approaches to crime prevention and correctional practices.
Keywords: criminal anthropology; Praskovya Tarnovskaya; anthropometry; hereditary causes of crime; female criminal; criminal proceedings; penitentiary system; crime prevention
