Khort Mikhail
This article examines the applicability of virtue epistemology within the philosophy of science discourse. It argues that contemporary approaches in the philosophy of science often overlook the significance of subjective epistemic characteristics in scientific practice, tending to focus either on the social conditions of knowledge production (as seen in the Science and Technology Studies project) or on methodological and demarcation criteria (as emphasized in postpositivism project). Meanwhile, the recent value turn in epistemology introduces a subject-centered perspective to the philosophy of science, suggesting that disciplinary boundaries should be understood not only in terms of methodological differences, but also in terms of intellectual virtues cultivated by scientific communities. The relevance of this study arises from the need to employ conceptual frameworks from contemporary epistemology to discuss scientific disciplinary norms that encompass both value and cognitive content. The aim of this article is to propose a method for applying virtue epistemology as a theoretical framework for evaluating the role of scientists’ subjective qualities in the pursuit of scientific knowledge. The author based his research on the hybrid virtue epistemology developed by Heather Battali and Christopher Hookway, which integrates reliabilist and responsibilist perspectives to defining intellectual virtue. This article discusses various levels of intellectual virtue, their impact on scholarly activity, and the conceptual challenges associated with such integration. The main findings underscore the importance of a hybrid approach to different intellectual virtues in achieving scientific objectives, such as obtaining verifiable truths and supporting a shared understanding within the scientific community. Additionally, the study also emphasizes the necessity of considering the values that underlie scientific inquiry, and the influence of personal beliefs on knowledge formation within the scientific domain.
Keywords: intellectual virtue; relativism; responsibilism; philosophy of science; hybrid virtue epistemology
Obolkina Svetlana
Modernity is facing a pronounced deficit of the real, prompting philosophy to undertake efforts to ‘unmask’ the nature of virtuality. The scope of the concept of virtual reality is continually expanding, with its content allegedly characterized as ‘invalid’ and/or ‘simulative’. In addition to that, the ideas of the real and the virtual are converging in a diffusive process. This article proposes a framework for understanding virtuality that utilizes classical ontological concepts to examine the practical mediation between reality and virtual reality. The first section discusses the theoretical challenges that arise in conceptualizing virtual reality. It concludes that virtual reality is more an act of realization manifested through the activities of both ontological and ontic subject, rather than a distinct entity. The second section analyzes individuals as subjects of such realization following Nikolai A. Nosov's research into virtual psychology. It also emphasizes the importance of those systems through which reality undergoes virtualization. The third section introduces the concept of a virtuality machine to analyze these mediators facilitating the transition from the constant to virtual reality. Since media philosophy tends to posit that media is far from being neutral, this section explores various media/mediators of virtuality machines: including chemical, computational, and musical. The author examines both the potential threats posed by virtuality machines and their promising applications. The concluding section proposes that a virtuality machine has the potential to evolve into a virtus machine, a tool that could enhance rather than alienate human nature.
Keywords: virtuality machine; virtual reality; machine; computer technology; computer game; neural network; tonal music; virtus
Maidansky Andrey
The article examines the plan-prospectus of the system of logical categories developed by the Soviet philosopher Evald V. Ilyenkov in 1957 for the collective volume Dialectical Materialism. The document consisting of 5 sheets printed on tracing paper is preserved in the archives of the Russian Academy of Sciences among the reports and minutes from the meetings of the Dialectical Materialism Section at the Institute of Philosophy of the Soviet Academy of Sciences. Ilyenkov proposed a structure for presenting dialectical logic (theory of cognition) as a system of categories that progress from abstract to concrete. To the best of our knowledge, the issue of systematically presenting dialectical logic is neither resolved nor even addressed in Ilyenkov’s published works. However, this document elucidates his conception of the order for logical categories and the overall structure of logic. In addition to that, Ilyenkov was influenced by the arrangement of categories in Georg W.F. Hegel’s Logic, and aimed to develop a dialectical-materialist alternative. This article highlights key criticism of Hegel’s order of category derivation, particularly from Ludwig Feuerbach and Friedrich Adolf Trendelenburg. In addressing this issue, Ilyenkov grounds his approach in the definition of philosophy as the relationship between thinking and being, or the process of cognition utilizing logical categories that express “those universal regularities to which the development of being (nature and society) and thinking are equally subordinated”. Ilyenkov believes that the first category of “concrete logic” is interaction, and he defines it as “the form and result of dialectical development”, with each subsequent category intending to reveal increasingly nuanced insights into the “true objective meaning” of interaction and development. The article identifies several drawbacks of Ilyenkov’s approach to constructing a system of dialectical categories. Central to his logical development is Ilyenkov’s category of contradiction, which he regards as the universal principle of interaction and the source of development. The article concludes by outlining the evolution of Ilyenkov’s thought on the foundational category of dialectical logic, highlighting that interaction gives priority to the category of the universal before advancing to the category of substance, with the latter interpreted in terms of Spinoza’s philosophy.
Keywords: logical categories; deduction of categories; materialist dialectics; pure being; becoming; interaction; concrete; universal; substance